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Since January 1, 2002, pursuant to UNMIK Regulation1 no. 1999/4, 
the EURO (‘’EUR’’) was adopted as the legal currency in Kosovo, and 
was made the factual currency of the country. All client accounts held by 
the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo (CBK) and commercial banks 
were converted from DEM into EURO, on an irreversible currency 
exchange rate of DEM 1,95583 per 1 EURO. As a result, in practice, 
while the Euro is legal and while accounts are held in this currency, 
almost all transactions made in Kosovo are titled and made in Euro. The 
use of a sustainable currency was important to maintaining a macro-
economic stability and played a decisive role in rebuilding the people’s 
trust on the financial sector. On the other hand, the CBK does not emit 
currency, and as such, it does not perform any monetary and exchange 
policies. The currency regime adopted by Kosovo may be rather 
challenging, given the absence of traditional monetary instruments and 
the exchange rates. Therefore, the main concern remains whether fair 
policies (both fiscal and regulations related to the financial sector) will 
support this regime. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate costs 
and benefit brought upon the Kosovar economy by the use of Euro as a 
main currency in circulation, and how affordable are the costs in 
comparison to benefits brought by the Europeanization of the Kosovo’s 
economy. 
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Introduction 
One of the numerous challenges arising before Kosovo 
immediately after the conflict was the selection of a monetary 
structure. Considering the great rush for possession of cash and 
currency exchange, and the disappearance of the Yugoslav Dinar 
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as a means of transaction, it was no surprise that in September 1999, by one of 
its first rules “On currency allowed for use in Kosovo”, UNMIK legalized the 
German Mark and other foreign currencies in Kosovo. In fact, it was the 
Kosovo population itself which had adopted the German currency as its 
common money. The UNMIK Regulation had only identified the German Mark 
as the currency in which the budgets, financial records and accounts of public 
organizations, agencies and institutions, including UNMIK itself, would be 
formulated. Simultaneously, this rule would offer all stakeholders the freedom 
to enter into any contract or any other voluntary transaction, based on a 
generally recognized and accepted currency. Furthermore, this rule had 
removed all checks and limits of currency exchange from possession, use or 
placement of any currency, in cash or bank account, transferred within or from 
outside of Kosovo. 
The German Mark was unilaterally adopted, as a de facto legal currency, 
and there were no negotiations with the German Bundesbank or the Central 
European Bank at that time2. Such adoption would come after two decades of 
extreme monetary instability, associated with a high rate of unofficial use of the 
German Mark as a reserve value and means of exchange. In the pre-conflict 
period, the German Mark was the most used currency; there were considerable 
amounts of cash in circulation. The population had become familiar with the 
currency. Following adoption of the DEM as a legal tender, unilaterally set by 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the 
transition to Euro would come as a natural sequence, implemented by the 
European Union States3. Remittances sent by the Kosovar diaspora, estimated 
at €500 million in 2002, had already created a consistent and considerable 
movement of cash into Kosovo for several years. These incomes were virtually 
all in cash. After the conflict, in the absence of banking services in Kosovo, the 
largest part of foreign direct assistance in Kosovo also underlined the necessity 
of cash.  
The CBK aims to implement financial policies which in a close future will 
make it part of the ECB. The Euro is an official currency in Kosovo, since 
February 2002, but Kosovo is not part of the EuroZone, since a prerequisite to 
integration with the ECB and the Euro-Zone is the integration of the country in 
the EU. The fact that the ECB monitors and oversees the cash flow, transfers, 
payments, loans in Kosovo already underlines that in a way or another, the 
CBK is member of the ECB, although not a fully fledged member (it does not 
enjoy the right of emission of currency). This means that for the Euro is the 
official currency before membership with the EMU. Therefore, unilateral 
                                               
2 The Fifth Conference of the Bank of Albania, 24-25 March 2005 (Michel Svetchine, Kosovo’s 
Experience with Euroization of its economy), pg. 252. 
3 http://www.bqk-kos.org/?cid=1,135&archive=true, Euroisation outside euro-zone: assets and 
challenges the experience of Kosovo, pg. 1. 
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introduction of the Euro is not an opportunity to avoid steps foreseen by the 
Treaty on adoption of the Euro. 
The beginning of 2009 marked the 10th anniversary of the Euro, the currency 
which approximated economic and financial policies of hundreds of millions of 
Europeans. Euro countries now enjoy a larger and safer market, less 
endangered by depreciation and inflation. The Euro is already the largest 
currency in Europe and the world wide. The Euro offered Kosovo a stable 
monetary environment, facilitated economic transactions with the main trading 
partners of Kosovo, etc., but also brought some costs upon Kosovo as well, such 
as loss of seniorage revenues, loss of sovereignty over the monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, costs may be considered bearable, in comparison to advantages 
brought to the Kosovar economy by the Euro. 
 
1. Costs and benefits of a common currency 
Costs of a monetary union derive from the fact that when a country 
abandons its own national currency, it also loses an instrument of its economic 
policy, consequently losing the ability of enforcing national monetary policy 
and exchange norms. In other words, in a full monetary union, the Central 
national Bank ceases to exist, or rather loses control. This implies that a country 
joining a monetary union will not be able to change the price of its currency (by 
devaluation or revaluation), to determine the amounts of such national 
currency in circulation, or changing short-term interest rates4. 
It is widely known that different countries have different economic 
development rates. Countries with difficulties in trading balances, when joining 
a monetary union, will not be able to cover for the trade deficits by devaluating 
national currency, thereby rendering products of that country more 
competitive in the foreign market. Countries are also different in their fiscal 
systems. These differences often compel the countries to use different 
combinations of funding budgetary deficits. The budgetary deficit can be 
covered by obtaining debts (loans) and by emitting money, or by increasing 
inflation. Therefore, countries with a less developed fiscal system, in 
comparison with other countries of the monetary union, will bear higher costs 
in increasing revenues by increasing taxation rates, although it would be more 
favourable to increase revenues by inflation. But, these countries, when they 
join a monetary union, where members are countries with a lower inflation 
rate, a norm which should be observed, they should either increase their taxes, 
or let their deficit grow further.  
While costs of a common currency are more related to the macroeconomic 
management of economy, benefits are most probable at the microeconomic 
level. Elimination of national currencies, and transfer to a common currency, is 
expected to produce benefits in the economic efficiency, such as: 
                                               
4 Paul De Grauve: “Ekonomiksi i Unionit Monetar’’, first edition, 2003. 
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• Reducing transaction costs between member countries, 
• Improving allocation efficiency of price mechanisms, 
• Higher transparency fosters competition, thereby bringing benefits to 
consumers, 
• Stimulation of integration in other areas (financial, institutional, political), 
• Positive effects in trading flows within the union. 
The elimination of transaction costs from a currency to another is surely the 
most obvious benefit of a monetary union. These costs are eliminated when 
countries use a common currency. The EC Commission has accounted for these 
benefits, and has resulted into a figure of between 13 and 20 Billion Euros 
annually5. This makes for one fourth and up to half of 1 percent of the GDP of 
the Community. This might seem irrelevant at first sight. Nevertheless, it must 
make part of the list of benefits from a common market. Research in various 
countries has shown that around 5% of banking revenues are fees paid to banks 
in exchanging national currency. This revenue source seems to vanish with a 
monetary union. 
Elimination of transaction costs brings about also indirect benefits (although 
hardly measurable). The introduction of the Euro should provide for a greater 
transparency in prices, meaning that consumers can now see prices in common 
currency units and be able to compare and trade better. Lower transaction costs 
and a greater price transparency, according to Euro supporters, are considered 
to be the largest benefits of using a common currency.  
It is widely known that economic agents base their decisions related to 
manufacturing, investment and consumption on the information obtained by 
the price system. If prices are unstable, the number of decisions on these 
purposes will decrease, therefore meaning that the pricing system will 
transform into an indicator to render fair economic decisions. Therefore, the use 
of a common currency, which requires the observation of many criteria set forth 
by the ECB, decreases inflation risks, and thereby providing a signal to 
individuals to take decisions on production or investment. 
Existence of a common currency also stimulates integration in other areas, 
financial, institutional or political. Existence of a common currency also fosters 
a greater trading cooperation within the Union members. 
 
2. Benefits of the Euro to Kosovo 
2.1. Support to the development of the financial sector 
The financial crisis in the former Yugoslavia had largely ruined the 
confidence in the banking system of that time. In this manner, with such an 
experience of inflation and collapse of the Dinar, it would be fairly difficult to 
regain the trust in a new financial sector in Kosovo, without having a stable 
currency. Therefore, the adoption of the Euro was a great facility in building 
                                               
5 Paul De Grauve: “Ekonomiksi i Unionit Monetar’’, first edition, 2003, pg. 60. 
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public confidence in the banking sector, and considering that assets and 
liabilities of the banking sector are reported in Euros, banks are virtually not 
exposed to risks of currency discordance (or the risk of exchange rates). As a 
result of Euro sustainability and stability, almost all deposits are made in Euro6. 
Euroization supported the development of the financial sector of Kosovo, 
which needed to rebuild from scratch after the conflict. In the beginning, there 
were no banks in Kosovo, and practically all transactions were made in cash. 
For almost two years, the only financial entity in Kosovo was the Micro 
Enterprise Bank (MEB), which had specialized in micro-loans. During the 
period between March and November 2001, six banks were established, 
thereby facilitating the much needed competition in the sector. 
In 2002 and 2003, the seven commercial banks of Kosovo expanded 
exponentially. In due consideration of the low economic development rates and 
negative experiences with the banks in the past, the banking system in Kosovo 
is characterized with a high presence of foreign banks. Domination of foreign 
banks is present also in the number of banks, and percentages of total funds of 
the banking sector. In 2009, foreign banks had six out of eight commercial 
banks operating in Kosovo, while making 91.67 percent (91.5 percent in 2008) of 
total turnover of the banking sector. It is important to underline that the 
banking sector in Kosovo is expanding its activities. This is shown by a 
persistent growth in the participation of assets, loans and deposits in the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). The participation of the banking sector in the GDP 
has grown to 56.5 percent in 2009, from 47.0 percent in 20088. The banking 
sector means got to a value of 2.1 Billion Euros in 2009, which is an increase of 
21.5% from 2008. In volume, loans have grown for 9.2%, fostered mainly by a 
growth in deposits.  
One must mention that all Kosovo banks do achieve, and a majority exceed, 
the minimal amount of equity of 5 Million Euros as required, thereby ensuring 
compliance with EU directives. 
 
2.2. Reduction of cash in circulation 
Reduction of cash in circulation was one of the key objectives of the CBK. 
This change provided a unique opportunity in achieving the objective, and at 
the same time facilitating consolidation of the banking sector. The CBK planned 
to exchange family amounts of up to 1000 German Marks for free for persons, 
and established a fee of 2% for amounts between 1000 and 10000 German 
Marks. This was also the maximum allowed amount of money to be exchanged. 
Amounts which went beyond 10.000 DM would be placed as banking deposits 
into Euros.  
                                               
6 http://www.bqk-kos.org/?cid=1,135&archive=true, Euroisation outside euro-zone: assets and 
challenges the experience of Kosovo, pg. 31. 
7 http://www.bqk-kos.org/?cid=1,69, Financial Sector Bulletin, Prishtina 2010, pg. 8. 
8 http://www.bqk-kos.org/?cid=1,134, CBK Annual Report 2009, pg. .40. 
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Establishment of maximum ceilings over exchange amounts, and a clear 
definition of a deadline for the period of circulation of both currencies, largely 
encouraged possessors of such money to deposit their money to the banks, 
instead of risking loss of deadline. This strategy was then coupled with bank 
incentives, which had already improved and multiplied their services, to attract 
new client accounts. This activity was not easy, and was associated with several 
problems, the biggest obviously being the lack of trust in the banking system. 
At that time, the commercial banks of Kosovo had only 24 offices, while the 
CBK operated with a network of 23 offices, in which more than half were small 
local agencies, working in limited hours, and 7 groups of mobile banks. 
Nevertheless, the three months period before the change of cash marked an 
increase of approximately 300 Million Euros in banking deposits. The amount 
of deposits in the banking sector in 2007 got to the amount of 1.1 Billion Euros, 
which was 23.5% more than 2006.  
The introduction of Euro was finished successfully on 28th of February 2002. 
From this moment, the Kosovo economy was fully and effectively “euroized”9. 
Euroization is often defined as the adoption of the Euro as a legal and official 
currency by authorities of a country outside of the Euro-Zone. This means that 
Kosovo does not have independent monetary policies, and neither does it enjoy 
any control on interest rates. It is a country which has recognized the Euro as 
an official currency, but it is yet to become a member of the European Monetary 
Union.  
 
2.3. Monetary stability 
The Euroization brought a long-awaited monetary stability to Kosovo. By 
decreasing inflation and eliminating risks of exchange rates, Euroization 
brought to a post-war Kosovo a stable monetary environment, which is much 
demanded for economic development, though not sufficing alone. 
At a time when Kosovo chose Euroization, annual inflation rates were at 
over 40%. Its official currency (the Dinar) had depreciated totally, and its use 
was almost non-existential. UNMIK was not only replacing a depreciated 
national currency, but was also establishing a sound monetary establishment, 
much necessary for an economic, social and political reconstruction in the years 
to come10. 
Inflation in Kosovo did not disappear immediately after the introduction of 
the German Mark, and Euro later. In the years of 2000-2001, Kosovo marked 
double-figure inflation, helped also by large foreign assistance and private 
incomes. Consequently, inflation was considerably slowed down, and is now 
                                               
9 Myrvete Badivuku-Pantina: Costs and benefits of Euroization in Kosova, 3rd International 
Scientific Session “Challenges of the Knowledge Society”, University “Nicolae Titulescu”, 2009, 
Bucharest, pg. 8. 
10 Erdin Maloku, Monetary policy and the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo – advantages 
and disadvantages of the use of Euro in Kosovo, Prishtina, 2010, pg. 66. 
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maintaining a figure below average inflation of the Euro-Zone. Obviously, 
there are other contributing factors apart from Euroization, such as for example 
the high unemployment and poor economic activities. 2009 had marked a 
deflation of 2.4%, mainly affected by the lower prices of import. 
In general, adoption of the Euro as a national currency brought monetary 
stability to Kosovo. The risks of depreciation of the national currency were 
eliminated. The CBK, which operates as a fiscal agent for the local 
administration, is not subject to exchange risks, while managing official 
reserves. These reserves are mainly invested in Euro-Zone countries, central 
banks and financial institutions. In the same manner, the Euroization has 
prevented a double exchange rate of currency, legally and informally. This fact 
should have brought a lower cost of loaning and investment growth, in 
promoting economic growth and welfare.  
Nevertheless, the global financial crisis, which affected the whole world, has 
had its toll in Kosovo, especially in attracting foreign investment and 
remittances. The internal gross product marked a decrease, economic growth 
declined to 4.4% in 2009, in a comparison with 5.4% in 2008. Public expenditure 
marked an increase of 39%, making for 14% of the GDP in 2009. The trading 
deficit was 37% of the GDP, while exports only marked 8.6% of imports, and 
only 6% of the GDP in 200911. 
 
2.4. Reduction of transaction costs 
Reduced transaction costs related to a smaller number of foreign exchange 
transactions are often thought to be one of the major benefits of a monetary 
union12. 
Euroization eliminates transaction costs with economic partners who also 
use the Euro, but obviously it does not eliminate transaction costs with 
countries using other currencies. Elimination of transaction costs should 
facilitate foreign exchange, and furthermore increase economic productivity. 
Apart from these, the use of Euro left behind the bureaucratic exchange 
controls, thereby enabling Kosovo entrepreneurs to trade without any 
administrative obstacles. Nevertheless, independently of the possibility of Euro 
benefits in relation to the reduction of transaction costs, it will depend on 
Kosovo itself to reallocate labour and capital – which earlier were employed in 
funding foreign trade operations, for a more productive economy, such as other 
financial and economic activities. However, the low transaction costs brought 
by the use of Euro must be viewed as an additional factor to economic growth, 
but not as a key factor. The high trading imbalance continues to be a great 
challenge for the economy of Kosovo. Heavy reliance of economy on imports, 
                                               
11 http://www.telegrafi.com/ekonomi, The Crisis has hit Kosovo too (Kriza ka goditur edhe 
Kosovën). 
12 Jan Zika, IES FSV UK, Cost and benefits of a monetary union, European Economic Policies, 
2005\2006, pg. 5. 
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and a low export rate at the same time, has brought to a high trading imbalance 
in Kosovo. As a result of global crisis in 2009, exports and imports marked a 
decline, while the trade deficit only marked a modest annual growth rate. High 
imports have brought to a trade deficit in 2009 to the figure of 1.7 Billion Euros 
(44.5% of the GDP), while exports were only at 8.6%13. As in other years, the 
deficit was mainly covered by remittances of Kosovars working abroad, and by 
the donor sector.  
 
2.5. Macroeconomic Stability 
Euroization in Kosovo had also several long-term political objectives. 
Euroization in Kosovo is expected to take care of economic stability, to solve 
the problem of confidence, and most importantly, to improve fiscal discipline, 
by eliminating the possibility of emitting money to cover for budgetary deficits. 
After a longer period, when other conditions are met, all these factors would 
need to have an impact on attracting foreign direct investments to Kosovo14. 
Also, it is thought that the use of a stronger international currency would bring 
about the decline of interest rates, thereby attracting investment, and as a 
result, a positive influence in development of economy. 
 
2.6. Declining interest rates 
A common currency facilitates the decline of nominal interest rates, thereby 
promoting investment and economic growth15. One of the benefits of 
Euroization was supposed to be the levelling of interest rates in Euro-emitting 
countries. The introduction of the Euro in Kosovo was expected to decrease 
capital costs and foster a faster economic growth. 
 
Table 1. Average effective interest rates 
Average affective interest rates in commercial banks, in %  
(August-December 2009) 
 Interest rates 
Kosovo EU 
Deposits 
Household: over 2 years 5.38 2.53 
Non-financial corporate: over 2 years 4.58 2.77 
Credits 
Household: up to one year 13.00 7.28 
Non-financial corporate: up to one year 15.44 4.17 
Sources: CBK, ECB 2009. 
                                               
13 http://www.bqk-kos.org/?cid=1,134, CBK Annual Report 2009, pg. 51. 
14 http://www.bqk-kos.org/?cid=1,145, Kosovo experience in euroization of its economy. 
15 D.MarioNuti, Cost and benefits of unilateral euroisation in Central Eastern Europe, January, 
2002, pg. 7. 
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Nevertheless, table 9 reflects a large difference between interest rates in EU 
and in Kosovo. Specifically, interest rates in Kosovo are much higher than EU. 
Most importantly, the spread of interest rates in Kosovo shows that in Kosovo, 
households enjoy a discounted loan interest rate versus the non-financial 
corporations, while it is the opposite in EU. This shows that priorities of 
financing in the EU are different. In a specific manner, this would be argued 
with the fact that the capital cost in EU is cheaper for the non-financial 
corporations than households, thereby encouraging investment. It can be noted 
thus, that the capital costs for households in Kosovo are cheaper than those for 
non-financial corporations. This may to an extent explain the slow investment 
pace in Kosovo. 
Although interest rates are considered to be rather high for Kosovo, they 
would be even higher if Kosovo would have its own national currency, since 
exchange rates would have to cover for risks related to the inflation forecasted 
on currency fluctuations, to not mention fund costs, which would be much 
higher for an unsafe and unstable currency.  
 
2.7. Lower currency risks 
According to Eichengreen (2002), lack of sustainability of national currency 
creates a greater risk for failure in payments, which causes a higher debt cost. 
Many countries which have their own national currencies have to face a higher 
cost of loans, due to difficulties in performing on their obligations. The 
EUroization in Kosovo has eliminated the possibility of depreciation of the 
currency. As such, the internal risk in Kosovo was eliminating by giving 
domestic enterprises the possibility of easier access to both internal and 
international financial markets. According to this theory, Kosovo would enjoy 
an investment growth due to a lower cost, which would in turn reflect in an 
economic growth16.  
 
                                               
16 Erdin Maloku, Monetary policy and the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo – advantages 
and disadvantages of the use of Euro in Kosovo, Prishtina, 2010, pg. 70. 
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Figure 1. Foreign direct investments in Kosovo, and economic growth in the Euro-Zone 
 
Source: Annual BCK Report (2009) 
 
In contrary to the theory, Euroization in Kosovo did not facilitate the decline 
of loan costs, nor in the increase of investment. In comparison to other 
countries of the Western Balkan, which have their own currencies, Kosovo 
bears a higher loaning cost and a lower economic growth rate. Nevertheless, 
loan costs and growth are not only dependant on exchange choices. There are 
other institutional features in Kosovo which largely affect its economic 
performance, specific being the lack of sustainable state institutions. 
Furthermore, neither the government nor domestic companies can obtain 
foreign debts. Lack of clear warranties discourages direct foreign investment. 
 
2.8. Faster monetary integration with the Euro-Zone 
One of the arguments for Euroization is a faster economic integration with 
the Euro-Zone. This requires an increased level of market integration, with the 
assumption of decreasing trade limitations. There is also an expectation of a 
better access to international financial markets.  
 
Figure 3. Trading structure by trading partners, in percentages 
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Source: Annual Report, CBK (2009) 
Considering the data in Kosovo, trade in the EU has increased considerably, 
as a result of lower transaction costs related to the use of the Euro. Main trade 
partners of Kosovo remain the countries of the European Union (EU) and 
member countries of CEFTA17, with which Kosovo, in 2009, had 74.4 percent of 
its trade. Kosovo exports with EU countries, in 2009, marked a decline of 24.7 
percent, which is higher than the decline of exports towards the CEFTA 
countries, which reflects a higher impact of the economic crisis in the EU 
countries. Nevertheless, participation of exports with these countries in the 
total of Kosovo exports was 45.5 percent, which is an increase of 2.8 pp, in 
comparison with 200818. 
EU and CEFTA countries were the main trading partners of Kosovo also in 
imports, with a participation of 38.7, respectively 36 percent in total imports. 
The greatest participation in imports from the EU countries was taken by 
German countries, with a value of 235.4 Million Euros, or 12.4% of total imports 
in 2009.  
 
3. Costs of Euroization for Kosovo 
Although as presented above, the Euroization had positive effects for the 
economy of Kosovo, it also brought its costs. Nevertheless, costs would be 
bearable in comparison to advantages of euroization. The most obvious costs 
for the Kosovar economy are considered to be the following: 
 
3.1. Loss of Seigniorage revenues  
Seigniorage means the difference between interest earned on securities 
acquired in exchange for bank notes and the costs of producing and 
distributing those notes. A key direct cost of Euroization is the loss of 
Seigniorage revenues by producing domestic currency, because they (member 
countries) do not represent anymore the producer of an official currency used 
                                               
17 Central European Free Trade Agreement. 
18 http://www.bqk-kos.org/?cid=1,134, Annual Report 2009 of CBK, pg. 52. 
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in the country. It is known that the budget deficit may be financed by obtaining 
a loan and by emitting money or by increasing the monetary basis (by 
increasing inflation). By Euroization, economies do not have access to printing 
money, and therefore they cannot generate funding sources in emergency 
cases19. When a country joins a monetary union, that country should obviously 
maintain an inflation rate within the boundaries set by the union. Therefore, 
less developed countries, when joining a union of more developed countries, 
they would even have to reduce inflation rates, since developed countries have 
a lower inflation rate. In this manner, authorities are bound to use various 
policies, such as emergency taxes to fund their expenditure. 
In transition economies, Seigniorage revenues are usually low, maybe 1-2 
percent of the domestic product (Shcobert, 2001)20.  
In the case of Kosovo, the loss of Seigniorage revenues was considered to be 
a rather low cost. If Kosovo would have its own national currency, possible 
revenues from producing money would be negligably low. One must state the 
fact that when Kosovo had a double currency system (DEM and Dinar), and 
further turned towards using the strong DEM currency to use the Euro later, 
the use of domestic currency would be small, considering the fact that the 
people living in Kosovo would keep their savings in Euro. As a result, in a view 
of large Euroization, the use of a domestic currency would be very small in 
Kosovo. In general, the cost incurred due to the absence of sources from 
making money was strongly displaced by the stability and credibility brought 
by Euroization. 
 
3.2. Loss of sovereignty over monetary policy  
Adoption of a currency other than the national currency makes the 
monetary policy move from the Central Bank of such a country to the European 
Central Bank, which is responsible for preserving price stability in the Euro-
Zone. Nevertheless, several years ago, the CBAK had initiated a dialogue with 
the European Central Bank, which concluded with a signature of the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the two institutions. By this 
Memorandum, the CBK was exempted from a part of the financial burden 
related to the transport of banknotes and Euro coins for circulation into 
Kosovo. 
The loss of monetary policy independence in Kosovo should not be taken as 
a large cost. Since the economy of Kosovo is in transition, it is rather useful for 
it to have a sustainable monetary policy. Having gone through a hyper-
inflation period in its history, it would have been very hard for Kosovo to 
create confidence in its currency.  
 
                                               
19 Jetmir Likaj, Euroisation in Kosovo : Benefits and costs, Amsterdam, July 2006, pg. 32. 
20 Domenico Mario Nuti, Albania and the Euro, pg. 116. 
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3.3. Loss of “regulatory powers” of national policy  
Countries which impose completely free currency exchange rates, and which 
do not pertain to the monetary union, with a view of potential benefits from 
trade expansion. A country, when facing a loss of competitiveness of domestic 
products, by devaluating the domestic currency, it influences the growth of 





3.4. Difficulties in realizing the function of “creditor of last resort” 
The stability of a banking system depends on the abilities of the central bank 
to provide short-term credit for banks and other financial institutions in case of 
liquidity risks. This way, the Euroization eliminates the capacity of emitting 
money, thereby rendering difficult the function of the creditor of last resort. 
Nevertheless, Chang (2000) and Wojcik (2000)22 argue that there are three other 
ways of replacing this function. Firstly, the Government may provide liquid 
funds to commercial banks, or by accumulating foreign reserves or by loaning 
from international financial institutions. Secondly, the presence of foreign 
banks reduces the need for a creditor of last resort. The third way is by 
introducing higher liquidity demands for the domestic banking system. 
Firstly, the function of creditor of last resort is rather difficult to substitute in 
Kosovo. Considering that the Government of Kosovo is facing with a deficit of 
current accounts of 16% of the GNP, it does not have surplus funds neither 
great amount of currency reserves.  
Secondly, the large presence of two foreign banks, with a deposit market 
share of 66.8 percent in the banking system of Kosovo, reduces the need for the 
function of creditor of last resort. Foreign banks can easily obtain funds from 
their parent institutions in case of risks of liquidity.  
Thirdly, the CBK has continuously increased minimum requirements of 
capital for banks, thereby achieving the level of 5 Million Euros since 2006. 
According to Basel Standards on sufficiency of capital, the total capital in the 
banking system marked 17.9 percent of assets pondered on 31 December 2009. 
This policy may be considered as a substitute of the function of creditor of last 
resort.  
As a conclusion, none of the three alternatives to the function of creditor of 
last resort can be implemented in Kosovo without incurring major expenditure 
in the economy as a whole.  
 
                                               
21 Myrvete Badivuku-Pantina: Costs and benefits of Euroization in Kosova, 3rd International 
Scientific Session “Challenges of the Knowledge Society”, University “Nicolae Titulescu”, 2009, 
Bucharest, pg. 10. 
22 Jetmir Likaj, Euroisation in Kosovo: Benefits and costs, Amsterdam, July 2006, pg. 31. 
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Conclusion 
The adoption of foreign currency as an anchor in Balkan is not a recent 
phenomenon. Since the second half of the 20th Century, former Yugoslav 
countries used DEM, as a first or as a second currency. The political divorce of 
former Yugoslav republics only strengthened further the role of the DEM in 
these economies, thereby resulting into recommendations of an official unila-
teral Euroization. Nevertheless, such an official unilateral Euroization is most 
like to bring about considerable benefits, but also major costs. 
The adoption of the Euro in Kosovo brought more benefits in terms of 
ensuring macroeconomic stability in economy, which is of major importance. 
Experiences of inflation, including the financial system collapse in the former 
Yugoslavia of the 90-ies, undermined the confidence on the national currency, 
and consequently it brought a high rate of currency replacement, in Kosovo 
and its neighbours. Considering the unique political and economic status of 
Kosovo, the necessity of a stable monetary environment, it is essential to 
construct a sound macroeconomic framework. Therefore, the adoption of the 
Euro as a legal tender of the territory was associated with numerous benefits. 
The Euro brought a much needed monetary stability, by lowering inflation, 
by eliminating the risks of exchange rates, which as a result, facilitated the 
reduction of transaction costs and in promoting trade and investment.  
However, the theory had been much more promising. In terms of reducing 
transaction costs, despite the increased trade with the EU, international trade is 
still concentrated in neighbouring countries which do not use the Euro as an 
official currency. Although the currency risks have been eliminated, Kosovo is 
yet to enjoy this benefit, due to a lengthened state status. On the other hand, 
instead of reducing domestic interest rates, Euroization has not reduced these 
interest rates. To this day, Kosovo has the highest interest rates in Balkan.  
As with any medicine, Euroization has its own side effects. The loss of 
monetary policy and exchange rates were at the forefront of the argument. 
Although the adoption of Euro includes some loss of competitiveness in 
relation to exports, monetary policy only has a provisional effect. The only 
permanent solution in the way of fiscal policies can pump production and 
foster exports. Loss of seigniorage is irrelevant in the case of Kosovo, because 
Kosovo did not have its currency before Euroization. 
In facing with possible contractions in using monetary mechanisms, a 
diligent banking oversight is of high importance. Such careful measures are the 
best ways to ensure financial stability, as part of a more comprehensive 
stabilizing objective. Other additional careful measures based on a well 
maintained financial system, which could be the promoter of objectives to a 
wider development and growth in Kosovo. 
The path towards European integration includes the adoption of the Euro in 
the future. By making this step, and with the assistance of the international 
community, Kosovo will not only be prepared for possible integration, but can 
How affordable are the costs compared to benefits brought by the euro to the Kosovo’s economy 
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already use the Euro in an active manner, as an instrument to go towards the 
European Union. 
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